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ABSTRACT
This paper presents some perspectives
on Japanese international environmental
policies. The first section reviews domestic
factors, Including the role of environmental
values, the influence of the Japan Environ-
ment Agency (JEA), the influence of women
on environmental policy, and prospects for a
stronger environmental lobby. The second
section describes some evolution in Japan's
policy toward addressing specific interna-
tional issues and suggests factors likely to
shape future policy development .in this
area. Finally, the concluding section fo-
cuses on the relationship between Japan's
energy and environmental policies, noting in
particular the remarkable technological Inno-
vation of Japanese industry in response to
domestic pressures to control air pollution
and improve energy efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
In many areas, the word most often used
to describe Japanese policy is "enigma." In
some ways, Japan's record on environmen-
tal policy also has elements of mystery and
contradiction. On the one hand, Japan's his-
tory and culture often are associated with a
reverence for nature. Indeed, Japan does
lead the world In certain environmental ar-
eas, such as reduction of conventional air
pollutants and compensation of air pollution
victims. On the other hand, Japan has been
widely criticized for its poor record in preserv-
Ing Its domestic environment, contribution to
tropical deforestation, and unwillingness to
protect endangered species.
Today, the international community
clamors for Japan to take its share of re-
sponsibility, as an economic superpower, for
the global environment. To secure its place
In world affairs, Japan slowly has begun to
respond to this pressure on issues ranging
from Ivory importation to reduction of CFC
emissions. There Is some hope that thegovernment's particular willingness to ad-
dress global warming may be a sign of signif-
icant changes to come in Japanese envi-
ronmental policy. However, international
pressure remains on the many environmen-
tal issues Japan has yet to resolve, Including
tropical deforestation and financing of Third
World development projects that harm the
environment.
Japan's environmental policy is most ef-
fective when government and industry co-
operate to find technical solutions to envi-
ronmental problems. Although In recent
years Japan's energy consumption has risen
sharply, the Japanese have developed nu-
merous technologies to reduce pollution
and Increase economic growth by improving
energy efficiency. It Is In these technologies
that Japan has made the greatest strides and
has the most to offer the global environ-
ment.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY IN JAPAN
A. Environmental Values In Japan
It is generally thought that the Japanese,
because of their religious beliefs, value na-
ture much more than Westerners, a cultural
stereotype that has some historical basis.
Joseph Kitagawa notes in his book On Un-
derstanding Japanese Religion:
Japanese Buddhism affirms the
sacrality [sic] of the world of nature.
This feature is probably the most
basic to the Japanese Buddhist un-
derstanding of reality.1
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Edwin Reischauer adds in The Japanese:
Early Shinto centered around the
animistic worship of natural phe-
nomenon-the sun, mountains,
trees, water, rocks, and the whole
process of fertility.2
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, man was
placed above and apart from the rest of na-
ture at creationl.3 In contrast, Shinto and
Buddhist beliefs maintain a reverence for
natural things and view the entire universe-
animate and inanimate-as one.4
Japan and the United States begin with
different views of nature, which has had pro-
found effects on their respective environ-
mental policies. Localized opposition move-
ments protested against continued pollution
in Japan at least as far back as the late nine-
teenth century, but pollution only became a
national issue with the mercury poisoning at
Minamata and air pollution lawsuits against
major industries in the 1960s.5 In the United
States, however, environmentalists have
focused on conservation of the wilderness
since the nineteenth century; Americans
assign strong symbolic and cultural
significance to their national parks. The
Japanese hold more utilitarian views, con-
sidering nature a resource for humanity to
enjoy.6 The management of Japanese na-
tional parks generally is oriented toward facili-
tating maximum visitation and recreational
activity, possibly including resort develop-
ment. The Shiga Heights area, home for
tribes of mountain monkeys, had one hotel
before designation as a national park. As of
1987, "ilt now has twenty-two ski resorts
and 101 hotels."7
In the United States there is a great deal
of public support for protecting even the
remote parks of Alaska, although few Amer-
icans expect to go there and the land may
contain substantial oil reserves. In contrast,
threats to the forests of Hokkaido and the
coral reefs in Okinawa, both of which the
average Japanese is likely to visit, evoke
much less concern in Japan. Perhaps the
most glaring example of this lack of concern
is Mount Fuji, revered for centuries in
Japanese paintings and poetry. The land-
scape of the mountain today reveals a
different attitude among the Japanese to-
ward nature:
There is a huge parking area with
shops, restaurants, horses to ride
and photographers. Coachloads ar-
rive, crowds emerge and Immedi-
ately line up to have their pho-
tographs taken .... (Wjhen the sun
lights Fujisan It reveals the tin cans
and other rubbish left behind by the
visitors who had come to see
Japan's symbol of ultimate purity.8
In a 1989 fourteen-natlon survey com-
missioned by the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme ("UNEP"), only 44% of the
Japanese public polled expressed a willing-
ness to contribute money or labor to Improv-
ing their environment. Other nations In the
survey expressed a 60% to 100% willing-
ness to contribute to betterment of the envi-
ronment. Although they expressed great
apprehension about global climate change,
Japanese respondents cited polluted drink-
ing water as their foremost environmental
concern, followed by the pollution of lakes
and rivers.9 However, In a country where
pollution has had devastating effects on
human health, the Japanese believe far less
often than respondents from other nations
that environmental deterioration threatens
public health.
B. Lack of a Strong Citizen's Lobby
The modern Japanese environmental
movement began in the early 1960s with
anti-pollution citizen movements that op-
posed crippling and even lethal industrial
pollution. These anti-polluion movements
had a significant impact on the government's
overall environmental policies. The govern-
ment tightened environmental regulations
significantly and in some areas, particularly
control of traditional air pollutants, Japan be-
came a world leader. However, in contrast to
experiences in the United States and Eu-
rope, Japanese environmentalists have
failed so tar to build a strong national move-
ment able to influence the national political
agenda. The UNEP poll showed that most
Japanese do not believe voluntary agencies
or community organizations in Japan play an
important part in resolving environmental
problems, which they view as the responsi-
bility of the government. Onlj 26% of
Japanese respondents, compared to 80%
to 90% of other respondents, expressed
support for leaders of such organizations.10
Eugene Linden of Time Magazine notes,
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[i]f anything will hold back progress
[on environmental issues], it will be
Japan's lack of environmental ac-
tivists and experts. Only about
15,000 Japanese-most of them
bird watchers-belong to conserva-
tion groups, and the country does
not have an extensive network of
environmentalists, like those who
monitor policies in the United States
and Western Europe."
A brief examination of the Japanese en-
vironmental movement's evolution will eluci-
date Its current status and prospects for
change. The first environmental activists
were pollution victims and their families, and
others who lived in contaminated areas.12
They organized in response to local prob-
lems, which were often health or nuisance
related (for example, noise levels). While
these efforts often provided relief, they did
not lead to larger coalitions of similarly af-
fected parties or provide the basis for a na-
tional environmental movement. 13 Indeed,
as Frank Upham argues, the creation of dis-
pute resolution procedures and an adminis-
trative system for compensating victims ef-
fectively preserved bureaucratic control.' 4
Environmental groups became notably
less active and influential after the early
1970s as public attention shifted toward the
oil shocks of 1973 and national political
scandals in the Tanaka administration.' s The
environmental movement was unable to
establish an effective bureaucratic foothold
despite the creation in 1971 of an environ-
mental agency with its own minister (see
section D). For example, neither the citi-
zen's movements nor JEA could persuade
the Diet to pass a general environmental im-
pact assessment bill. The courts, which had
provided environmentalists with a series of
Important victories in the 1960s, also re-
treated in several major cases that could
.have provided an avenue for environmental
litigation on a wide range of issues.'6 Al-
though the outcome of the pollution trials of
the 1970s generally favored plaintiffs, court
decisions of the 1980s tended to favor
government and industry defendants.' 7
The movement continues to face opposition
from Industry, government, and the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
The feeling that the government is too
big to fight contributes to the prevailing pub-
lic apathy about the environment,1 8 and the
inaccessibility of important government
documents reinforces this perception. The
national government has no Freedom Of In-
formation ("FOI") Act. Some towns and pre-
fectures do have FOI ordinances, but these
often unduly limit access to information. Ac-
cording to the Japan Times, "[p]oliticians
have begun to define as public documents
only those papers that have been officially
stamped by a set number of officials. Bu-
reaucrats have learned to avoid stamping
sensitive documents to keep them out of
public hands." An environmental protection
committee in the town of Oiso that opposed
the construction of a chemical research labo-
ratory by the Showa Denko company was re-
fused access to municipal and prefectural
data on the project. The committee also was
denied the town mayor's letter to the com-
pany, urging Showa Denko to approve the
project quickly, presumably to head off local
opposition. In another case, the Japanese
Citizen's Movement for a Freedom of Infor-
mation Law finally obtained data on Japa-
nese nuclear reactors through the United
States Freedom of Information Act, having
been denied the information from the
Japanese government. The government
provides such information to the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission but
not to Japanese citizens. Fortunately, some
LDP members are pushing for an FOI law.
Several factors, including United States
pressure and support from the Japan Com-
mittee for Economic Development, work in
favor of the legislation's passage.' 9
As discussed in Section E, there are
some signs of change in the public's attitude
toward the environment.
C. The Influence of Japanese Women on
Environmental Policy
Women composed the largest numbers
in the anti-pollution movements of the
1960s and 1970s and have provided much
of the leadership for the anti-nuclear move-
ment of the 1970s and 1980s. 20 it may be
that women are accepted in Japanese soci-
ety as environmental activists because they
generally are viewed as caretakers of family
and community.
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Housewives belong in large numbers to
the neighborhood women's associations,
called Fujinkai, to the larger Shufuren, the
Housewives' Association, and to the Japa-
nese League of Women Voters. Chifuren,
the largest women's organization, is an um-
brella organization that channels volunteer
work to women through the Fujinkal. Chi-
furen members frequently have addressed
environmental issues on the local level. 21
Today's women's groups focus less on pol-
lution and more on dangerous and over-
priced consumer goods. Chifuren success-
fully fought against dangerous food addi-
tives, for consumer labeling on fruit juices,
and for lower-priced televisions and cosmet-
ics in the 1960s and 1970s. 22 Having met
some of its initial goals, the organization has
been noticeably less active in the 1980s. 23
Today, because of advances in time-
saving goods for the home, housewives
have even more leisure time to devote to
community service and political activity. Karl
van Wolferen, author of The Enigma of Japa-
nese Power, calls Japanese housewives "a
potentially important political presence."24
Their recent political history indicates that if
women's roles change in Japan, they are
likely to have greater influence over envi-
ronmental policy.
Today, however, Japanese women
"have a lower political profile than in almost
any other democratic country."2s It is unclear
whether women are gaining greater status;
their environmental impact may be minimal
for some time to come. In 1989, Prime
Minister Kaifu appointed two women-an
unprecedented number-to his Cabinet at a
time when the LDP was least popular with
female voters. One appointmentwas Mayu-
mi Moriyama, a leading Diet member el-
evated to chief cabinet secretary. Following
his successful reelection in 1990, however,
Kaifu replaced both women with men. Mrs.
Moriyama protested that she had been used
to attract the female vote and dropped when
the election was over.28
Surprisingly, there are fewer women in
the Japanese Diet today than in the 1950s.(It should be noted, however, that there are
far more women per capita in the Japanese
Diet than in the United States Congress.)
Although more women than men vote in
Japan, "... few women run for election and
still fewer win, in spite of the fact that women
constitute a majority of the electorate.2 7 It
may be that widespread opposition to the
LDP in 1989 spurred the election of several
women to the Diet. However, it Is likely that
Japanese women will continue to wield their
greatest political Influence in the voting
booth. Exit polls from 1989 show that
women overwhelmingly joined men to ex-
press their dissatisfaction with Prime Minister
Uno, linked to a sex scandal, and the LDP's
1989 consumer tax.28  Some observert
conclude that the Influence of Japanese
women on politics is on the rise, but as one
Japanologist said, "When you start low,
there's only one way to go."29
D. The Role of the Environment Agency
The Japanese Diet established the
Japanese Environment Agency (JEA) In
1971, largely In response to pollution vic-
tims' demands that the government take a
more responsible approach toward the envl-
ronment. The agency's mandate Is to coor-
dinate and administer programs to prevent
environmental pollution and to protect na-
ture.30 JEA has limited authority over a wide
range of environmental law, including
pollution control for Individual factories, toxic
wastes, and the, regulation of sewage, waste
disposal, marine pollution, and agricultural
chemicals.31 JEA also manages Japan's
national parks.
Although JEA provides an Important fo-
cal point for environmental advocates and
analysis, the agency has much less power
than the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) and other established agen-
cies with missions to bolster economic
growth. 32 Some scholars include JEA
among the "relatively Ignored structures of
Japanese politics," 33 and many believe that
JEA cannot afford to offend industry.34
By the early 1980s, paralleling develop-
ments in United States environmental poli-
tics, the environmental agenda lost some of
the political support it had attained In the
previous decade. The government suc-
cessfully campaigned to reduce public con-
cern over pollution, noting reductions In the
levels of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and
photochemical smog, but downplayed prob-
lems with toxic wastes and chemicals, In-
cluding dioxin, water pollution and contam-
ination of drinking water.35 Japanese par-
ticipation In international environmental ne-
JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 39
gotiatlons was, and continues to be, domi-
nated by economic ministries.
The environmental budget grew steadily
during the 1970s, but MITI and the Ministry
of Construction, rather than JEA, received
much of this funding. Industrial pressure
forced JEA to reduce some emission control
standards 36 and cut certain programs insti-
tuted In the 19703 to strengthen environ-
mental administrations in cities and prefec-
tures.3 7 Due to opposition from industry and
other ministries, JEA most notably failed to
persuade the Diet to pass environmental
impact legislation, a priority for the agency
since the early 1970s. JEA proposed but
failed to pass environmental impact laws five
times by 1980.38 A cabinet resolution finally
Implemented a weaker Impact requirement in
1984.
Despite its weaknesses, JEA is gradually
becoming a more established and accepted
part of the government. Until the 1980s,
former members of MITI and the Ministry of
Finance composed most of the agency's
senior directors. Many JEA officials retained
their old allegiances, anticipating that they
would return to their previous agencies.39
Today, however, many JEA officials expect
to finish their careers there. Moreover, in the
annual contest among government agen-
cies to recruit top graduates from Tokyo Uni-
versity, a growing number have made JEA
their first choice.
Absent a shift in national values toward
environmental protection, JEA's biggest
problem may be the lack of an organized
environmental movement that forcefully can
counter the tightly organized industrial
lobby. In the mid-1980s, industry argued
that Japan had reduced air pollution so ef-
fectively that emissions no longer signifi-
cantly contributed to health problems. In-
dustry successfully lobbied the government
to amend its pollution compensation system
to halt all new designations of air pollution
"victims." This system, which compensates
people suffering health problems from air
pollution, Is unique to Japan.4° Environ-
mental opposition was too weak and the
amendments were enacted in September
1987.
E. Recent Developments in Environmental
Activism in Japan
Important indicators of new interest in
conservation and wildlife protection may be
recent environmental protests opposing
several dams, an airport project in Okinawa
that threatens a coral reef, and housing for
United States military personnel in the Ikego
forest.
During 1989, campaigns were mounted
to halt construction of dams on the Kamo
River in Kyoto, the Shimanto River in
Shikoku, and the Nagara River, running from
the Japanese Alps to Ise Bay.41.4 2 The battle
for protection of the Nagara in particular has
become a major organizing issue.43 The
proposed dam will kill most of the river's sixty
species of fish, including a species of trout
called ayu, a delicacy for which the river is
known. The Nagara is the only river where
enough ayu exist for cormorant fishing, a
unique sport under the patronage of the Im-
perial Household Agency since the Meiji
Restoration. 44.45 'Tradition still holds that
part of the first catch each season lands on
the Emperor's table. Because of this legacy,
the Nagara River is one of the cleanest rivers
running through a major urban area in Japan
today, and one of the last major rivers not to
be dammed."46
Despite vehement public opposition,
dam construction began in July 1989. Sev-
eral critics submit that the government has
an unstated reason for continuing with the
project. The dam, they charge, would help
alleviate international (primarily United
States) pressure on Japan to increase its
spending on domestic projects and employ
more foreign goods and services.47
When local issues did not attract much
national attention, environmental groups
found it easier and more effective to solicit
help from abroad than rely on Japanese
support to protest government policies. In
these cases, foreign pressure has benefit-
ted the environmental movement. For ex-
ample, Japanese conservationists solicited
help from foreign scientists and international
environmental organizations to protect a rare
coral reef off the Island of Ishigaki in Okinawa
where an airport was planned.48 The gov-
ernment later moved the construction site to
a nearby location.
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In another instance, environmentalists
entreated American officials and environ-
mental groups to oppose a Japanese gov-
ernment plan allowing the United States
military to build housing for its personnel in
the Ikego forest near the town of Zushi. The
Natural Resources Defense Council made
efforts on their behalf. The issue even
generated a letter from the head of the
Smithsonian to the Secretary of Defense
asking why the United States government
was building housing in an environmentally
sensitive area.49 Ikego shelters a number of
endangered species and is one of the few
forests still standing in the Tokyo area. Sup-
port for the forest's preservation was so
strong that a head of the opposition move-
ment defeated Zushi's pro-housing mayor in
the latter's 1986 bid for reelection.50
There are indications of growing public
and corporate interest in global environmen-
tal issues. A new environmental fad has
flourished favoring sprays that do not con-
tain chlorofluorocarbons, biodegradable
plastic shopping bags, a new brand of beer
called "Suntory is Thinking About the Earth,"
and clothing with wildlife pictures on them.5'
In Osaka and Tokyo in 1989, citizen
conferences on the international envi-
ronment attracted considerable public inter-
est and media coverage. A government-
sponsored conference on the environment
that was closed to the public provided the
impetus for these citizen meetings. Over a
thousand people, many of them students
and housewives, attended the Osaka
meeting. Similar meetings have been held
in the past, including several on tropical rain-
forest issues, but none have been nearly so
large.
On the corporate level, a 1990 Japan
Economic Journal survey found that sixty of
113 major companies had established or
planned to establish environmental commit-
tees or sections. In response to increasing
pressure from American and European envi-
ronmentalists, most of Japan's largest trad-
ing companies have created environmental
sections. They apprise the firm of tighter
domestic and international environmental
standards, help improve its image, and find
business opportunities for new environmen-
tal technologies and products.5 2
In the remainder of this report, we focus
in more detail on the strengths and weak-
nesses of Japan's environmental record and
suggest indications of change that give
hope of a broader and more forward-looking
environmental policy in the future.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE
POLICY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
With few exceptions, Japan has been
slow to recognize and respond to Interna-
tional environmental problems and agree-
ments.5 3 Local concerns historically have
taken precedence over International envi-
ronmental issues. This is due In part to the
history of the anti-pollution movements.
Pollution victims had a war to wage at home
and had neither energy nor resources to ad-
dress international issues as well. However,
a July 1990 poll conducted by the Prime
Minister's office found that almost 60% of re-
spondents believe that the government's
first priority should be preservation of the
global environment, particularly protection of
the ozone layer and tropical forests, and re-
duction of C02emlsslons.5 4 These results
contrast with a previous poll released by the
same office in February 1989, In which only
one-fifth of respondents indicated a strong
personal interest In global environmental Is-
sues.55 Growing domestic concern for the
global environment, combined with pressure
from abroad, has forced the Japanese gov-
ernment to reconsider its position on many
environmental issues, Including driftnets,
endangered species, and global atmo-
spheric pollution.5
A. Driftnets
Of all nations, Japan has the largest
driftnet operation for fishing.57 Squid and
tuna fishermen cast these huge nylon nets
that cover an area of ocean up to 40 miles
wide and 40 miles deep. Environmentalists
have called driftnet fishing "aquatic strip
mining"58 because the'nets, set out over-
night, randomly kill porpoises, seals, sea tur-
tles, sea birds, and other marine animals.
United States, Soviet and Canadian fishing
industries also complain of the massive loss
of sea trout and salmon.59 In 1989, Japan
agreed to have American and Canadian
observers aboard some of the 460
Japanese squid boats to determine the
number of sea animals being killed.60
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In 1989, fifteen countries in the South
Pacific called for a total ban on driftnet use.
Japan subsequently implied that the move
might jeopardize Japanese aid and trade to
these countries, a form of "checkbook diplo-
macy" that provoked an Immediate negative
response. 61 On September 19, a subcom-
mittee of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives approved legislation to ban drift-
nets worldwide. Japan then announced its
Intention to reduce the number of ships
permitted to use driftnets by two-thirds.62 In
July 1990, the Foreign Ministry announced
that the government would suspend drift net
fishing In the South Pacific for the 1990-91
season. The suspension, beginning in
November, will last until "regulatory
measures for drift net fishing are
established."6 3
B. Endangered Species
Japan has been the largest ivory im-
porter, accounting for 38% of the world's to-
tal. In June 1989, MITI announced an ivory
Import ban from September 20 through the
end of 1989. The move followed bans by
several European countries and the United
States to save the African elephant from
extinction and preceded the probable
signing of a worldwide agreement. 64 On
October 30, 1989, the Japanese
government announced a total ban on ivory
trade.65
The ivory ban is suggestive of the grad-
ual change in Japan's attitude toward en-
dangered species. In 1980, Japan signed
the Washington Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, but had more exemptions to the
agreement than any other signatory. 66
Some of those exemptions, particularly on
whales, remain the subject of severe inter-
national criticism. However, in 1987, Japan
enacted a law on the domestic trade of en-
dangered species to enforce the Conven-
tion within the country.6 7 Also since 1987,
Japan has agreed to prohibit imports of the
green sea turtle, the musk deer and the
desert monitor lizard. Japan has responded
so slowly to halting this trade in part because
MITI, the ministry most interested in eco-
nomic development, has delayed limiting the
imports of some endangered species.6
C. Global Atmospheric Pollution
In September 1987, more than twenty
countries signed the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
agreeing to reduce CFC emissions by 50%
over the next decade. Japan, which con-
sumes more than 10% of the world's CFCs,
opposed the treaty until only a few months
before its conclusion. Japanese industry
was skeptical, environmentalists were largely
uninvolved, and government research was
limited.
Ultimately, Japan took action largely be-
cause the United States and Europe had
agreed to do so, and because non-signato-
ries risked adverse trade consequences
designated in the Protocol and in several
bills pending in the United States Con-
gress.69 Once Japan did agree, however, it
moved quickly to implement the agreement.
MITI requested several million dollars for FY
1990 to develop CFC substitutes.7 ° Several
Japanese automakers promised to phase-
out CFCs in automobile air conditioners by
1993.71 Japan supported an accelerated
and complete international phase-out of
CFCs adopted in June 1990.
Unlike its response to most other envi-
ronmental issues, Japan has shown rela-
tively quick progress in supporting measures
to prevent global warming. Japan an-
nounced in June 1990 that It will stabilize its
CO 2 emissions by the year 2000 "at the
lowest possible level." The government's
announcement also included proposals for
increased research and monitoring of climate
change and the development of technolo-
gies transferable to other countries to facili-
tate global reductions in greenhouse
gasses.72
The June proposal triggered a debate
between MITI and the Environment Agency
concerning Implementation of the "lowest
possible level" target. MITI had projected a
16% increase In CO2 emissions by 2000,
despite rather optimistic assumptions about
the availability of additional nuclear power.
Japanese utility companies expressed con-
cern about the technical feasibility of CO2
limitations in the face of rapid growth In de-
mand and limited supply alternatives.73
On October 23, 1990, the Japanese
government approved an "Action Plan to Ar-
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rest Global Warming," setting the target of
stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions at the
1990 level by the year 2000. The an-
nouncement was accompanied by a detailed
list of measures to achieve the target includ-
ing improving energy efficiency, promoting
tree planting, and educating the public. The
targets, however, are not binding or en-
forceable should the programs prove to be
inadequate.74
Several American environmental groups
have expressed concern that Japan's green-
house gas emissions will increase in
response to the United States-Japanese
Structural Impediments Initiative ("SI"). The
initiative, intended to reduce trade friction
between the two countries, calls for infra-
structural improvements and promotion of
leisure activities in Japan that will lead to
greater general consumption, and therefore
may increase greenhouse gas emissions. 75
Japan accounts for about 5% of the
world's CO 2 emissions, following the United
States, the Soviet Union and China.78 Japan
has been well-represented and active at the
principle governmental meetings on climate
change. With the support of the Prime Min-
ister's office, the Japanese government
hosted a major international meeting on the
global environment in September 1989 in
Tokyo. MITI, the Ministry of Transportation,
the Science and Technology Agency and
others have made large funding requests for
global warming research. Industry is well-in-
formed about global warming. Manufactur-
ers see potential market opportunities In
environmental regulation, such as increased
sales of fuel cells.
A 1989 JEA report described climate
change as a serious threat to Japan's import
supply and suggests some understandable
self-interest motivating Japan's growing at-
tention to global warming. Japan is highly
dependent on foreign oil, timber and some
food staples such as soybeans. Thus the
impact of climate change on foreign markets
greatly concerns Japan. For example, the
1973 drought in the Soviet Union led that
country to increase its imports of United
States wheat, which resulted in higher prices
on the world market. Also in 1973, a poor
harvest of sunflowers in the Soviet Union
and of peanuts in India led to panic in the
Japanese soybean market. Since economic
activity in coastal areas results in approxi-
mately 90% of Japan's GNP, a sea-level rise
due to global warming could have serious
consequences for Japan 7
D. Foreign Aid
Growing international pressure has
forced Japan to assume more responsibility
for the global environment. With nine of the
world's ten largest banks In 1989, and 53 of
the world's 100 largest companles,78 Japan
is now the leading financial contributor to
developing countries. 79 However, much of
Japan's aid is tied, devoted to infrastructure
projects, such as mining operations, in-
tended to benefit Japan.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that
the Japanese government has made "con-
tributions to the globe a national goal."
Further, "Japan should take Initiatives In the
development of international strategies and
systems to support remedial efforts In ...
protection of the ozone layer, global warm-
ing, protection of tropical forests, prevention
of desertification, elimination of acid rain,
land] protection of endangered wildlife
species."80 To combat its image as being
internationally irresponsible, the Japanese
government aimed to double Its giving in
United States dollars between 1986 and
19 9 0 .
81 It met this goal by 1989, and also
reached its five-year target of providing $40
billion (United States) in development
assistance.82
The Official Development Assistance
("ODA") budget recently has grown consid-
erably-6.5% between 1987 and 1988 and
an additional 7.8% between 1988 and 1989.
The 1989 budget totalled $11 billion, $2 bil-
lion more than the United States budget.83
In 1989, Japan planned to allocate approxi-
mately $2.25 billion In environmental aid
alone over the next three years.8 Japan will
give Mexico $1 billion in credits over three
years to fight air pollution.8s
Despite these Increases, a 1989 World
Wildlife Fund report (Timber from the South
Seas) charges that Japan's percentage of
aid still lags behind that provided by most
members of the Development Assistance
Committee ("DAC") of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"). Japan ranks fifteenth among the
eighteen member nations. DAC countries
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aim to contribute 0.7% of their Gross Do-
mestic Product ("GDP"), while Japan do-
nated only 0.31% of its GDP in 1988. How-
ever, for 1988-1998, Japan plans to in-
crease the proportion of aid as a percentage
of GDP to 0.35% and to increase giving to
$50 billion.88
According to Timber from the South
Seas, a central problem with Japanese de-
velopment ald is that no single administrative
body has the experience or the authority to
supervise all of the development pro-
grams.87 Moreover, there Is no general law
on foreign aid that would help the many aid
institutions coordinate their efforts.8 8 While
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the official
coordinating body, numerous ministries and
agencies are involved in the decision making
process. Japan International Co-operation
Agency, the Overseas Economic Coopera-
tion Fund, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries, and the Ministry of
Finance each participate in some aspect of
project selection, definition, appraisal, moni-
toring or funding. As a result, implementa-
tion, appraisal and monitoring of on-going
projects and evaluation of finished projects
is poor.89
Because many development offices are
new or growing, they often are inexperi-
enced and have yet to gain the stature of
other long-time administrations.90 Many aid
agencies are severely understaffed. Richard
Forrest of the National Wildlife Federation
notes that although the Japanese
government prides itself on the small size of
its bureaucracy, this "... would not seem to
be an asset for the world's largest and fastest
growing development financing program,
which needs careful control and monitoring.
There are reports that Japan cannot even
disburse all of its promised ODA budget ev-
ery year, much less study in detail the effects
of the funding, due of a [sic] lack of staff."9'
Moreover, Japanese officials and ministers
are not always apprised of how ODA funds
will be used-further evidence that Japan's
aid programs are inadequately supervised.
The government also does not require envi-
ronmental impact assessments of its own
programs or those of the private sector.92
ODA only recently initiated environmental
policy guidelines for its assistance. Envi-
ronmentalists fear that inadequate supervi-
sion and evaluation will lead the government
to finance Japanese corporations intending
to gain a foothold in markets abroad.93
For example, JATAN, the Development
and Cooperation Program, has subsidized
the clearing of roads for logging by Japa-
nese companies in developing countries.
On the island of Sarawak, those companies
used the roads for timber exploitation, which
destroyed the centuries-old habitat of the
Penan people.94
Few of the problems the Japanese de-
velopment program faces are unique. No
one body coordinates environmental policy
or provides overarching environmental
guidelines for the United States government
either. The United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID) also has con-
tributed billions of dollars to environmentally
destructive programs, like the early 1980s
AID program to construct dams in Sri Lanka,
which later inundated forests and tea farms.
AID began to assess the environmental im-
pacts of its projects after several such envi-
ronmental catastrophes. However, other
United States Executive Branch agencies
involved In development assistance do not
yet require environmental impact assess-
ments. Agencies like the United States
Treasury Department that administer United
States lending to the World Bank and other
international lending institutions only have
begun this process.95
As discussed above, Japan's aid policies
will evolve as It establishes a position In in-
ternational affairs commensurate with Its new
economic power. By some accounts,
"Tokyo's hesitation to act has less to do with
an insider's lack of concern for the outsider's
problem and more to do with never before
being faced with a leadership role In these
areas."96
E. Tropical Deforestation: A Case Study of
Evolving Japanese Policy
Tropical deforestation is one of the in-
ternational environmental issues of greatest
relevance to Japan. In 1987, forests cov-
ered 25 million hectares, or 66%, of its land
surface, which means that Japan is still
among those countries with considerable
forestry resources.97 However, the Japa-
nese timber industry logs relatively little
domestic timber. Officials assert that most of
Japan's forests are on mountainous terrain
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(and therefore expensive to harvest) and do
not provide the hardwoods most wanted to
meet the growing demand for building mate-
rials and furniture. However, some foreign
authorities challenge these arguments,
noting that some of the tropical forests
Japan logs are equally mountainous.
Unlike most other international environ-
mental issues, tropical deforestation has at-
tracted modest public interest in Japan, and
an active citizen organization addresses the
issue. The Japanese government also has
taken a more active role than it has toward
other international environmental issues,
providing a secretariat for the International
Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) in Yoko-
hama.
Japan has been the world's leading
tropical timber importer since the 1960s.
Economic growth has fueled much of this
enormous timber and paper consumption.
The high price of indigenous timber, easy
access to inexpensive Southeast Asian
wood, and the high quality of tropical hard-
woods makes them especially attractive. As
the World Wildlife Fund argues, however,
"[a]lternative materials exist, are already in
use, and are assuming a growing impor-
tance."98
A September 1989 report by the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs downplays Japan's
role in tropical deforestation, asserting that
Japan imported only 1% to 2% of tropical
hardwoods in 1986 from Central and South
America and Africa, and only 2% of its tropi-
cal timber from other Asian countries. The
report argues that exports contribute very lit-
tle to the total deforestation problem: "The
main cause of deforestation is the destruc-
tive slash-and-burn method of agriculture
that poor farmers in developing nations use
to maintain their lives.'99
While the government may be correct
when viewing the problem globally, it does
not effectively respond to concerns about
the impacts of extensive logging in particular
areas. Commercial stands are being de-
pleted worldwide: currently, thirty-three de-
veloping nations are net exporters of forest
products; by the year 2000, fewer than ten
such nations may exist o100 The more difficult
issue may be what role Japanese firms, and
indirectly the Japanese government, should
take in demanding better management by
exporting nations, particularly since they are
increasingly taking control of harvests and
processing in order to export more high-
value wood products and fewer logs.
There are some indications that the
Japanese government is becoming more
sensitive to tropical deforestation. In re-
sponse to White House inquiries, Japan ag-
gressively denied official support for con-
struction of a highway in the western Ama-
zon, but the possibility of unofficial private
support remains. Deforestation Issues also
were highlighted in the Environment Agen-
cy's 1988 White Paper on the international
environment and at the September 1989
Tokyo conference on environment and sus-
tainable development.
The Japanese Environment Agency
claims that its International efforts will Include
"protection of the environment In develop-
ing countries," and particularly the protec-
tion of tropical forests and the ozone
layer. 01 Prime Minister Kaifu has pledged
part of Japan's three-year $2.1 billion envi-
ronmental aid package to tropical ralnforest
preservation.)0 2 Responding to accusations
that grants sometimes have supported
environmentally destructive activities (for ex-
ample, logging roads have reportedly been
built with foreign aid funds), Japan recently
took steps to apply environmental require-
ments to foreign aid programs.1 03 The
Foreign Ministry has also requested about$30 million in aid funds for ITTO programs on
forest preservation and technical assis-tance. o4
These financial contributions may be
part of a policy designed to promote tropical
forest preservation while allowing growing
hardwood imports. While seemingly Incon-
sistent, this approach is similar to that of
many developing countries which assert
some commercial logging is essential to
economic growth and consistent with "rea-
sonable" conservation goals. 05 As de-
veloping countries Increasingly seek to con-
trol the use of their resources, technical as-
sistance and multilateral pressure for struc-
tural reforms may be the most effective
levers industrialized countries can use to
promote tropical forest protection.'9o
Some Japanese industrialists and
traders realize that they cannot count on
tropical timber Imports indefinitely and ac-
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cordingly have begun to prepare for the fu-
ture. The government and forestry industry
have sponsored research on technologies
and products based on greater use of soft-
woods for some time. The logging traders
also have given token amounts ($71,000) to
help protect the rain forests.
III. ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Although weak concerning conservation
of nature, Japanese environmental policy
excels in an area the United States does
not-pollution reduction and energy effi-
ciency technologies. Government coopera-
tion with Industry to promote these tech-
nologies has reduced air pollution and In-
creased energy efficiency tremendously.
Japan, one of the worst polluters in the
1960s, became the world leader In clean air
and now exports large quantities of pollution
control technology. From 1973 to 1986,
Japan also cut energy consumption 50% per
unit of GNP. However, Japanese energy
consumption has increased significantly
since 1986 due to declining energy prices,
strong economic growth, new government
policies, and changing attitudes toward
conservation.
A. Energy Efficiency
Japan's economy Is one of the most ef-
ficient In the world, clearly demonstrating
that efficiency goes hand in hand with eco-
nomic growth. (See Table 1) However, al-
though Japan still uses half as much energy
as the United States to produce one unit of
gross domestic product,107 differing life-
styles, climate, population patterns, and
other factors make comparisons between
the absolute energy consumption of Japan
and other nations risky. The Japanese use
less central heating, live in a much smaller
area, and rely significantly more on rail and
subway systems for commuting than Ameri-
cans do. Thus, differences in energy con-
sumption are not as great as they first ap-
pear. Even so, Japan's continued progress
in efficiency during a period of rapid eco-
nomic growth is Impressive and a model for
all nations.
Japan achieved its greatest energy sav-
ings between 1979 and 1986, when it cut
energy consumption 20%. The government
proudly notes that from FY 1973 to FY 1986,
GNP grew 63% while energy demand grew
only 6.40/%.108 In addition to a high tax on
gasoline, incentives for specified conserva-
tion investments included accelerated de-
preciation or tax credits, reduced property
taxes, and loans. Small businesspersons
can obtain energy audits at no charge, and
all factories above a minimum size must have
a licensed energy engineer on site to pro-
mote energy efficiency. Minimum efficiency
standards also apply to some industrial pro-
cesses, buildings, automobiles and appli-
ances, supported by consumer labeling.10 9
How and why did the Japanese achieve
this progress? In a recent study,110 the
Association for the Conservation of Energy
suggests several reasons for Japan's suc-
cess in attaining energy efficiency and eco-
nomic growth, which provide lessons for
other OECD nations. First, the Japanese
government provides financial incentives,
regulations, standards, information and edu-
cation to help companies reach the highest
possible energy efficiency standards. Sec-
ond, a single government agency, MITI, ad-
ministers a comprehensive national program
for energy efficiency and has the power to
ensure that all sectors adopt its conservation
measures. Third, all companies larger than a
minimum size must have licensed energy
managers who supervise the firm to ensure
maintenance of the highest energy effi-
ciency standards. Fourth, to preserve effi-
ciency gains, the Japanese upgrade energy
efficiency standards for appliances and
buildings periodically. Finally, the govern-
ment has a long-term plan to obtain signifi-
cant Increases in national energy efficiency.
Japan's experience shows that eco-
nomic growth does not depend on growth in
energy supply. Indeed, improved energy
efficiency improves a nation's competitive-
ness in the international marketplace. An-
other important lesson is that Japan did not
rely solely on higher prices to spur efficiency
improvements.
However, lower oil prices, the strength
of the economy since 1986, and the stability
of the yen have led to a declining interest in
energy efficiency in Japan in recent years."1
OECD data indicates that the national
energy efficienc, index for Japan has not
risen since 1986 and that demand for
energy has been increasing since 1987.112
Japan's current increased energy use
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typifies the response of most industrialized
nations experiencing declining energy
prices. These policies may now change in
response to the war in Kuwait and renewed
concern about oil security.
Although official government policy
touts energy conservation as a primary goal,
the Japanese government has cut several
energy initiatives and relaxed some conser-
vation laws. Moreover, growth in personal
income and the declining real price of oil has
led to growing demand for automobiles, par-
ticularly larger automobiles, while the aver-
age fuel efficiency of new cars has declined
steadily since 1982. The government has
not attempted to combat this trend with
higher gasoline taxes, and it removed a com-
modity tax on larger cars in 1988 as part of
recent tax "reform" legislation. Electricity
prices, among the highest of any industrial-
ized country, also have been reduced to re-
flect the declining cost of fuel.113 Japan
could make significant energy savings in
appliances, automobiles, lighting and
buildings, where efficiency either has de-
clined or increased little. However, until fuel
prices rise, or until the government up-
grades its energy policies, It is likely that de-
mand will continue to increase while effi-
ciency lessens.114
The government and private companies
have taken some limited measures to stem
energy consumption since Iraq invaded
Kuwait in August, 1990. They are encourag-
ing citizens and employees to turn air condi-
tioners up to 800, turn off one-third of the
lights in offices, and adhere to an 80 km/hr
speed limit on highways. Even some corpo-
rations are "reexamining investment blue-
prints with an eye toward energy efficiency."
However, these measures are not expected
to yield large energy savings. The gov-
ernment seems to be relying on years of
energy planning to help the economy
through the crisis.115
The government's campaign to reduce
the personal savings rate and increase con-
sumption-a policy designed partly to ap-
pease the United States government-also
has contributed to growing energy use.
With the recent conclusion of the United
States-Japan SII talks promoting domestic
measures to increase consumption, this
trend may only worsen.1 16 The campaign
comes at a time when the Japanese have
decided to enjoy the benefits of economic
growth. Energy intensive luxury Items and
home appliances, such as electric bread
makers, full-size refrigerators, and microwave
ovens, have become fashionable. The
Japanese use more disposable goods to-
day, such as wooden chopsticks and paper
towels. More choose to drive rather than
ride the subway and buy bigger houses that
cost more to heat in winter and cool In
summer. Increasingly vain Japanese young-
sters are now taking "asa-shan"-mornng
showers to shampoo their hair-in addition
to the traditional evening bath.
According to Osamu Maeda, a Rlkkyo
University sociologist, "in the process of
economic growth, the people have gotten
used to their modern amenities and have
grown more distant from nature.... They
have lost some of their sensitivity to the envi-
ronment." 117 A Japan Economic Institute
report adds, 'here appears to be no place
for a public campaign to promote energy
conservation in this new consumer environ-
ment." 1" 8  If anything, new government
policies that relax restrictions on building
large retail stores In urban areas will acceler-
ate this trend.
The growth in energy use may be due to
government miscalculation rather than in-
tention. MITI assumed that with a stronger
yen/dollar ratio, Japan's economy would shit
from energy Intensive industries to In-
creased consumption of Imports and less
energy Intensive consumer goods. This has
not occurred, and the growth In energy use
accelerated from 0.4% in FY 1986 to almost
5% in FY 1987119 and rose another 5.4% In
FY 1988.120 Industrial growth and Increased
consumer spending on cars and durable
goods has resulted in greater electricity pro-
duction and consumption.' 21 (See Chart 1.)
The sharp increases in energy consumption
in 1988 and the beginning of 1989 have
forced MITI to address energy issues more
seriously.
MITI's latest energy plan (1990) focuses
heavily on energy conservation. MITI In-
tends to use various energy conservation
measures to Improve the GNP Base Unit(primary energy supply quantity/GNP) by
2.0% annually, with a total improvement of
36% by the year 2010, and to cut the energy
GNP elasticity ratio (growth rate of primary
energy supply/growth rate of the economy)
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for energy demand by 0.58%. To attain
these two goals, MITI aims to reduce energy
use by government and industry 11.2% from
what it would be in the year 2010 given cur-
rent trends. 122 This target is consistent with
a reduction in the energy used per unit of
GNP of 2% per year. The plan requires a
substantial improvement in cooling and
heating efficiency in residential use, vehicle
fuel efficiency and improved efficiency in
power generation facilities.
MITI projected a growth rate in energy
consumption between 1988 and 2000 of
1% for the industrial sector, 0.9% for the
manufacturing sector, 2.7% for the residen-
tial and commercial sector, and 1.9% for the
transportation sector. Between the years
2000 and 2010, however, the annual growth
rate in energy consumption for each of
these sectors Is predicted to drop to 0.6%
for the Industrial sector, 0.6% for the manu-
facturing sector, 2.0% for the residential and
commercial sector, and 1.3% for the trans-
portation sector.
To combat global warming and to reduce
its dependence on foreign energy imports,
thereby improving Japan's energy security,
MITI plans to promote increased use of new
energies, and hydro, geothermal and nu-
clear power to 27% of the energy supply by
2010. (See Chart 2.) In 1988, these non-
fossil energies provided 15% of Japan's en-
ergy supply. MITI will encourage research
and development of alternative energy from
methanol and solar power with the aim of
dramatically cutting solar facility costs, and
will install new facilities for generating power
from liquefied natural gas (LNG). MITI plans
to Increase the share of LNG in gasoline
used In motor vehicles in urban areas from
71% to 85% by encouraging small- and
medium-sized gas companies to convert to
natural gas. 123
The government views coal as a stable
resource and a major oil alternative. In the
wake of the 1973 and 1978 oil crises, the
Japanese government adopted an aggres-
sive policy to develop alternatives to oil. The
attraction of coal is clear: there are abundant
world reserves located in countries such as
Australia, China, and the United States
which can supply Japan conveniently via sea
routes. Many of Japan's suppliers also have
stable governments, and some allow foreign
ownership of coal fields or the companies
that control them. Thus, coal ensures Japan
a relatively secure fuel supply. However,
MITI believes it will'be difficult to increase
Japan's coal use in the mid- to long-term,
given the CO2 emissions that arise from coal
burning. 124 To combat these emissions, the
ministry proposes for FY 1991 to cut the
budget for coal liquefecation and gasification
substantially, from 24,901 million yen to
16,296 million yen.' 25
MITI also hopes to increase the share of
power generated from nuclear power plants
from 27% to 43% by the year 2010.126
Japan has maintained an enviable nuclear
safety and reliability record, ironically using
United States reactor technology. However,
Japan still is searching for a final solution to
disposal of its waste. Growing public op-
position may make it difficult to obtain new
sites for reactors, which will force utilities to
move further away from demand centers and
thereby increase costs. Such factors as TMI,
Chernobyl, the increasing Influence of
women (who tend to oppose nuclear power)
and an awareness of public opposition to
nuclear power in the United States and
Europe, have helped fuel anti-nuclear sen-
timents in Japan.127
B. Japanese Energy Technology and the
Environment 2
Sustained by low oil prices, Japanese
industry grew rapidly during the 1960s.
Then, shocked by the oil crisis of 1973 when
prices rocketed upwards, government and
industry undertook massive conservation ef-
forts that reduced energy use sharply and
quickly.
These conservation programs ad-
dressed virtually every aspect of Japanese
activity, ranging from home refrigerators to
steel mills. Conservation began with simple
acts, such as greater use of insulation, and it
progressed to complex and expensive un-
dertakings including the development of al-
ternative energy technologies. Japan now
consumes less energy per unit of GNP than
any other nation. This results from a con-
certed effort by Japanese industry, spurred
by government demands and cooperation.
Japanese government and industry
have developed a menu of technologies
and practices that demonstrate that pollution
-even carbon dioxide-can be cut sub-
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stantially in ways that increase efficiency and
lower costs. This experience challenges the
conventional wisdom among scientists,
engineers and politicians that pollution is the
inevitable consequence of industrial pro-
ductivity. The reverse may be true: the path
to true productivity may be one that leads to
zero pollution and 100% efficiency.
Japanese industry has succeeded in re-
ducing energy consumption in three funda-
mental ways. First, improved measurement
and control devices, such as exhaust gas
analyzers with information feedback mecha-
nisms that automatically adjust boiler air-fuel
ratios, have been installed to minimized en-
ergy consumption. Second, waste heat
collection systems are being used to capture
and reuse heat that otherwise would be
vented into the atmosphere. The Japanese
use a variety of devices ranging from heat
exchangers to automatic frequency controls
for electric pumps and blowers.
Finally, the Japanese have reduced en-
ergy consumption dramatically by changing
the production process itself. For example,
steel can be rolled into a product as it comes
from the blast furnace without being cooled,
or it can be allowed to cool, inspected for de-
fects, then re-heated for rolling. The former
process, now used at nearly all Japanese
steel mills, reduces energy consumption
enormously.
Following is a discussion of certain
Japanese innovations in energy efficiency
and pollution reduction. From the demand
side, we review advances made at Nippon
Steel and Toyota Motor companies, whose
new technologies reduce pollution and en-
ergy consumption significantly. From the
supply side, we discuss innovations in fuel
cells, nuclear reactors, combined cycle
power plants and coal combustion tech-
nologies that reduce pollution and provide
energy more efficiently, thus reducing the
country's dependence on imports and Im-
proving its energy security.
C. The Demand Side
1. Nippon Steel, Keihen Works
When it began operations in 1976, Nip-
pon Steel's Keihen Works was arguably the
most efficient steel mill in the world. Yet
during the next decade, the plant reduced
energy consumption by another 30%, en-
abling the complex to produce more steel
plate and tubing with less energy and pollu-
tion than any mill in history. The highly com-
puterized and automated plant, located on
an island in Tokyo Bay, turns out six million
tons of steel per year.
Each ton of steel from the Keihen Works
requires 5.7 million kilocalories of energy,
substantially less than the average at mills In
the United States and Western Europe.
Stringent pollution controls cut 802
emissions from the plant by more than 90%
and NO, by 80%, with comparable controls
on the superfine and frequently toxic dust
and soot that characterize steel production.
Nippon Steel officials estimate that the
Keihen Works is the third or fourth most
efficient mill in Japan. Without the pollution
control devises, it likely would be Japan's
most efficient.
2. Automotive Efficiency
Automotive fuel efficiency has Increased
by about 30% since the 1973 oil crisis. The
bulk of this improvement has been attributed
to decreases in bodywelght, adoption of
aerodynamically superior designs, and im-
provements in engine technology.
Toyota, the world's largesf auto manu-
facturer, is working on several pollution re-
duction and efficiency enhancement tech-
nologies. One is Improvement of the lean
burn engine, which simultaneously reduces
NO, emissions while increasing fuel econ-
omy. Toyota has the reputation among au-
tomotive experts of offering the best of the
lean burn engines. With current technology,
the company can meet Japanese and Euro-
pean standards, but its engines fall under
the more stringent United States require-
ments. Toyota is presently developing ways
for lean burn engines to meet some gov-
ernments' stricter NO, requirements while
preserving fuel economy gains.
As discussed above, fleet efficiency has
been declining since 1982 due to growing
demand for larger cars, declining oil prices,
and the elimination of some Incentives for
small cars. This led Toyota to drop produc-
tion of its smallest car due to lack of demand.
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D. The Supply Side
1. Fuel Cells
Fuel reacts with itself In a fuel cell togenerate electricity. Producing virtually no
sulphur dioxide (SO 2) or oxides of nitrogen(NOx), this technology holds extraordinary
potential for reducing air pollution. Fuel cells
can run on currently available fossil fuels and
their derivatives such as natural gas and
methanol, or on hydrogen, which might be
produced through the use of solar or nu-
clear-generated electricity. Because fuel
cells also are more efficient than conven-
tional energy technologies, they have the
potential to significantly reduce 002 emis-
sions by minimizing fossil fuel consumption.
Unlike most other energy technologies, fuel
cells may be versatile enough for small,
medium or large-scale applications, ranging
from automobiles to central power plants.
They make almost no noise, as there are no
noisy pistons or controlled explosions of the
sort that make gas and diesel engines run. It
may be possible to locate smaller scale units,
ranging from ten to fifty megawatts, in or near
city centers, eliminating the need for trans-
mission lines and minimizing the cost of land.
Fuji Electric is the largest fuel cell pro-
ducer in Japan. As of January 1989, Fuji had
11,000 kllowatts of fuel cell projects un-
derway In Japan and thirteen projects In the
United States and Europe. These projects
Include commercial electricity generation,
production of a fuel cell-powered forklift and
development of a fuel cell-powered bus for
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
Fuji has completed construction and
testing of a one megawatt power plant and
plans to undertake a five megawatt demon-
stration plant. Fuji believes it can cut pro-duction costs enough to compete with coal-
fired plants (whose conventional cost is$2,000 per kilowatt) by mass production of
standardized components. Fuji has made
enormous progress toward commercializing
fuel cell technology for generating electricityfrom natural gas since winning a four com-
pany competition supported by the Japa-
nese government. They now have a semi-
automated production facility for the man-
ufacture of fifty megawatt fuel cells for use in
medium-size commercial and residential
buildings. These will be turn-key units with
error detection systems built in to minimize
maintenance and service requirements.
Tokyo Gas Company has made a substantial
contribution to the development cost in re-
turn for a guarantee that they will receive fifty
kilowatt fuel cells with a minimum five-year
operating life at $1,800/kw by 1995. The
company benefits by selling gas to Fuji.
2. Nuclear Power
An experimental 2.8 megawatt demon-
stration breeder reactor, the "Monju," is un-
der construction and expected to achieve
criticality in 1992. Officials expect three pro-
gressively more powerful demonstration re-
actors to follow Monju, culminating in 1500
megawatt scale commercial plants sometime
between 2010 and 2030. Nuclear power is
already Japan's leading source of power, ac-
counting for more than one-fourth the na-
tion's electricity output.
As of June 1989, thirty-seven nuclear
power plants were running in Japan, produc-
ing 26.6% of the country's energy.12 9 As
discussed previously, growing questions
about the political future of nuclear power in
Japan may jeopardize proposals for addi-
tional plants. Japan now imports the fuel to
supply these reactors. However, if plans for
the development of fast breeder reactors
proceed on schedule, the nation will be-
come an exporter of fuel within a genera-
tion-possibly becoming the first nation in
history to bootstrap itself from energy buyer
to energy seller.
3. Combined Cycle Power Plants
Tokyo Electric Power Corporation("TEPCO") began construction of the
world's first large scale combined cycle
power plant in April, 1982. Perched on the
edge of Tokyo Bay, Futsu is today one of
the world's largest power plants and almost
certainly the cleanest. It produces 2000
megawatts of gas-fired electricity but emits
almost no SO 2 and less than one-sixth of the
nitrogen-based pollution allowed from new
plants in the United States
Three factors account for the extraordi-
nary performance of the Futsu plant. First, it
burns liquefied natural gas, one of the
cleanest fuels available. Second, it uses a
combined cycle system, burning the gas In
one turbine, then using the exhaust gases
to power a second turbine run by steam.
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Third, selective catalytic reduction, an add-
on device for pollution control, cleanses the
exhaust gases of NOx. Although other
power plants have employed one or two of
these approaches, Futsu is the first to use all
three. The combination makes the plant a
model of simultaneous pollution reduction
and increased efficiency.
4. Technologies to Reduce Pollution
from Coal Combustion
To increase efficiency and reduce air
pollution, Japan's Electric Power Develop-
ment Company ("EPDC") 130 is investing in
fluidized bed combustion ("FBC"), an inher-
ently cleaner combustion process for coal. A
finely powdered mixture of coal and lime-
stone is suspended in mid-air by blowing air
through it at tremendous velocities. The
cooler and more complete combustion
which results not only lowers levels of both
NOx and S02 but allows the use of a wide
range of different fuels. FBC can be cou-
pled with highly efficient turbines to reduce
air pollution still further.
Since 1980, EPDC has been testing a
process to powder coal, then mix it with wa-
ter to form a combustible slurry. As a liquid,
coal could be more easily transported,
loaded, and stored. The company also is at-
tempting to develop methods of dewatering
low-quality, sub-bituminous and brown
coals, which contain too much water to be
transported or burned efficiently. The re-
serves of this fuel are believed to be practi-
cally inexhaustible. Its use would increase
CO 2 emissions, but this increase would be
potentially much less than existing coal
combustion technologies because of its
greater efficiency. The reduction in C02 is
proportional to the improvement in effi-
ciency; improvements of 10-20% or more
are technically feasible.
E. Discussion
Japan has much to offer the world in the
development of innovative technologies
that clean the environment and bolster eco-
nomic growth. The prospect of future inter-
national environmental accords could have
economic benefits for Japan because of its
position of technological leadership. A
global warming agreement, for example,
might help promote markets for high-effi-
ciency appliances and industrial systems.
Pressuring developing countries to control
their pollution similarly could increase orders
for Japanese pollution control systems. At a
March 1990 presentation in Washington, a
MITI official described plans to develop
somewhat less effective but much less ex-
pensive pollution control technology for sale
to developing countries. Already, discussion
of a "green industry" has begun to appear in
the Japanese press, but so far these con-
siderations seem to be less politically salient
than the possible costs of environmental
controls on the Japanese economy.131
Indeed, Japan could do much more to pub-
licize its activities to provide a model for
newly Industrializing countries.
CONCLUSION
Japan's environmental policy Is weakest
in conservation of nature and protection of
the global environment and strongest In
pollution reduction and energy efficiency
technologies. It is with these technologies.
that Japan can make Important contributions
to resolving global environmental problems.
However, lack of domestic support for con-
servation and NGO activities remains a seri-
ous limitation on Japan's involvement In do-
mestic and international environmental Is-
sues. Japanese technology can benefit the
world significantly, but It cannot address all
environmental issues. Since World War II,
Japanese politics have been oriented to-
wards increasing the wealth of the country.
Today, how Japan addresses environmental
issues may relate to its need to find a moral
basis for involvement in International affairs
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Chart 1
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